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speaker's use of different types of referring expression. Centering was proposed as a model that 
accounted for this phenomenon. We argued that the compatibility of centering properties of an utterance 
with choice of referring expression affected the coherence of discourse. Subsequently, we expanded the 
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answer questions posed in GJW86. It has become ever more clear that it would be useful to have a 
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centering framework, and the original theoretical claims. This paper attempts to meet that need. To 
accomplish this goal, we have chosen to remove descriptions of many open research questions posed in 
GJW86 as well as solutions that were only partially developed. We have also greatly shortened the 
discussion of criteria for and constraints on a possible semantic theory as a foundation for this work. 
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Preface 
Our original paper (Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein, 1983) on centering claimed that certain 
entities mentioned in an utterance were more central than others and that this property 
imposed constraints on a speaker's use of different types of referring expressions. Centering 
was proposed as a model that accounted for this phenomenon. We argued that the compat- 
ibility of centering properties of an utterance with choice of referring expression affected the 
coherence of discourse. Subsequently, we expanded the ideas presented therein. We defined 
various centering constructs and proposed two centering rules in terms of these constructs. A 
draft manuscript describing this elaborated centering framework and presenting some initial 
theoretical claims has been in wide circulation since 1986. This draft (Grosz, Joshi, and 
Weinstein 1986, hereafter, G J W ~ ~ )  has led to a number of papers by others on this topic and 
has been extelisively cited, but has never been published. 
We have been urged to publish the more detailed description of the centering framework 
and theory proposed in G J W ~ ~  so that an official version would be archivally available. The 
task of completing and revising this draft became more daunting as time passed and more 
and more papers appeared on centering. Many of these papers proposed extensions to  or 
revisions of the theory and attempted to answer questions posed in GJW86.  It has become 
ever more clear that it would be useful to have a "definitive" statement of the original 
motivations for centering, the basic definitions underlying the centering framework, and the 
original theoretical claims. This paper attempts to meet that need. To accomplish this goal, 
we have chosen to remove descriptions of many open research questions posed in G J W ~ ~  as 
well as solutions that were only partially developed. We have also greatly shortened the 
discussion of criteria for and constraints on a possible semantic theory as a foundation for 
this work. 
2 Introduction 
This paper presents an initial attempt to develop a theory that relates focus of attention, 
choice of referring expression, and perceived coherence of utterances within a discourse seg- 
ment. The research described here is a further development of several strands of previous 
research. It fits within a larger effort to provide an overall theory of discourse structure and 
meaning. In this section we describe the larger research context of this work and then briefly 
discuss the previous work that led to it. 
Centering fits within the theory of discourse structure developed by Grosz and Sidner (1986), 
henceforth, G&S. G&S distinguish among three components of discourse structure: a lin- 
guistic structure, an intentional structure, and an attentional state. At the level of linguistic 
structure, discourses divide into constituent discourse segments; an embedding relationship 
may hold between two segments. The intentional structure comprises intentions and rela- 
tions among them. The intentions provide the basic rationale for the discourse, and the 
relations represent the connections among these intentions. Attentional state models the 
discourse participants' focus of attention at any given point in the discourse. Changes in 
attentional state depend on the intentional structure and on properties of the utterances in 
the linguistic structure. 
Each discourse segment exhibits both local coherence - i.e. coherence among the utterances 
in that segment-and global coherence - i.e. coherence with other segments in the discourse. 
Corresponding to these two levels of coherence are two components of attentional state; the 
local level models changes in attentional state within a discourse segment, and the global 
level models attentional state properties at the intersegmental level. 
G&S argue that global coherence depends on the intentional structure. Briefly, each discourse 
has an overall communicative purpose, the discourse purpose (DP); and each discourse seg- 
ment has an associated intention, its discourse segment purpose (DSP). Satisfaction of the 
DSPs contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. Relationships between DSPs provide the 
basic structural relationships for the discourse; embeddings in the linguistic structure are 
derived from these relationships. The global coherence of a discourse depends on relation- 
ships among its DP and DSPs. G&S model the global-level component of the attentional 
state with a stack; pushes and pops of focus spaces on the stack depend on intentional 
relationships. 
This paper is concerned with local coherence and its relationship to attentional state at  the 
local level. Centering is proposed as a model of the local-level component of attentional state. 
We examine the interactions between local coherence and choices of referring expressions, and 
argue that differences in coherence correspond in part to the different demands for inference 
made by different types of referring expressions, given a particular attentional state. We 
describe how the attentional state properties modelled by centering can account for these 
differences. 
Three pieces of previous research provide the background for this work. Grosz (1977) defined 
two levels of focusing in discourse, global and immediate. Participants were said to to be 
globally focused on a set of entities relevant to the overall discourse. These entities may 
either have been explicitly introduced into the discourse or be sufficiently closely related 
to such entities to be considered implicitly in focus (Grosz, 1981). In contrast, immediate 
focusing referred to  a more local focusing process, one that relates to identifying the entity 
that an individual utterance most centrally concerns. 
Sidner (1979) provided a detailed analysis of immediate focusing, including a distinction 
between the current discourse focus and potential foci. She gave algorithms for tracking 
immediate focus and rules that stated how the immediate focus could be used to identify 
the referents of pronouns and demonstrative noun phrases (e.g. "this party," "that party"). 
Joshi and Kuhn (1979) and Joshi and Weinstein (1981) provided initial results on the connec- 
tion between the complexity of certain types of inferences required to process a discourse and 
changes in immediate focus.' Their notions of "forward-looking" and "backward-looking" 
centers correspond approximately to Sidner's potential foci and discourse focus. 
In this paper, we generalize and clarify certain of Sidner's results, but adopt the "centering" 
terminology. We also abstract from Sidner's focusing algorithm to specify constraints on the 
' Joshi and Kuhn (1979) discussed the connection of "centering" to  the almost monadic predicate repre- 
sentation of an utterance in discourse and its possible relationships to complexity of inference. 
centering process. We consider the relationship between coherence and inference load and 
examine how both interact with attentional state and choices in linguistic expression. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 3, we briefly describe the 
phenomena motivating the development of centering that this paper aims to explain. Sec- 
tion 4 provides the basic definitions of centers and related definitions needed to present the 
theoretical claims of the paper. In Section 5 ,  we state the main properties of the centering 
framework and the major claims of centering theory. In Section 6, we discuss several factors 
that affect centering constraints and that govern the centering rules given in Section 7. In 
Section 8, we discuss applications of the rules and their ability to  explain several discourse 
coherence phenomena. In Section 9, we briefly outline the properties of an underlying se- 
mantic framework that are required by centering. Finally, in Section 10 we conclude with a 
brief comparison of centering with the research that preceded it and a summary of research 
that expands on G J W ~ ~ .  In particular, Section 10 provides references to subsequent inves- 
tigations of additional factors that control centering and examinations of its cross-linguistic 
applicability and empirical validity. 
3 Phenomena to be Explained 
Discourses are more than mere sequences of utterances. For a sequence of utterances to be a 
discourse, it must exhibit coherence. In this paper, we investigate linguistic and attentional 
state factors that contribute to coherence among utterances within a discourse segment. 
These factors contribute to the difference in coherence between the following two discourse 
segments: 
(1) a. John went to his favorite music store to buy a piano. 
b. He had frequented the store for many years. 
c. He was excited that he could finally buy a piano. 
d. He arrived just as the store was closing for the day. 
(2) a. John went to his favorite music store to buy a piano. 
b. It was a store John had frequented for many years. 
c. He was excited that he could finally buy a piano. 
d. It was closing just as John arrived. 
Discourse (1) is intuitively more coherent than Discourse (2). This difference may be seen 
to arise from different degrees of continuity in what the discourse is about. Discourse (1) 
centers around a single individual, describing various actions he took and his reactions to  
them. In contrast, Discourse (2) seems to flip back and forth among several different entities. 
More specifically, the initial utterance (a) in each segment could begin a segment about an 
individual named 'John' or one about John's favorite music store or one about the fact that 
John wants to buy a piano. Whereas Discourse (1) is clearly about John, Discourse (2) has 
no single clear center of attention. 
Utterance (2b) seems to be about the store. If a reader inferred that utterance (2a) was 
about John, then that reader would perceive a change in the entity which the discourse 
seems to be about in going from (2a) to (2b); on the other hand, if the reader took (2a) to 
be about the store then in going to (2b), tliere is no change. In either case, in utterance (2c) 
John seems to  be central, requiring a shift from utterance (2b), while the store becomes 
central again in utterance (2d) requiring yet another shift. This changing of 'aboutness' (in 
fact, flipping it back and forth) makes discourse (2) less coherent than discourse (1). 
Discourses (1) and (2) convey the same information, but in different ways. They differ not in 
content or what is said, but in expression or how it is said. The variation in 'aboutness' they 
exhibit arises from different choices of the way in which they express the same propositional 
content. The differences can only be explained, however, by looking beyond the surface 
form of the utterances in the discourse; different types of referring expressions and different 
syntactic forms make different inference demands on a hearer or reader. These differences in 
inference load underlie certain differences in coherence. The model of local attentional state 
described in this paper provides a basis for explaining these differences. 
Thus, the focus of our investigation is on interactions among choice of referring expression, 
attentional state, the inferences required to determine the interpretation of an utterance in a 
discourse segment, and coherence. Pronouns and definite descriptions are not equivalent with 
respect to their effect on coherence. We conjecture that this is so because they engender 
different inferences on the part of a hearer or reader. In the most pronounced cases, the 
wrong choice will mislead a hearer and force backtracking to a correct interpretation. The 
following variations of a discourse sequence illustrate this problem and provide additional 
evidence for our conjecture. 
(3) a. Terry really goofs sometimes. 
b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he was excited about trying out his new sailboat. 
c. He wanted Tony to join him on a sailing expedition. 
d. He called him at  6AM. 
e. He was sick and furious at being woken up so early. 
By using a pronoun to  refer to Tony in utterance (e) the speaker may confuse the hearer. 
Through utterance (d) Terry has been the center of attention and hence is the most likely 
referent of "he" in utterance (e). It is only when one gets to  the word "sick" that it is clear 
that it must be Tony and not Terry who is sick, and hence that the pronoun in utterance (e) 
refers to Tony not Terry. A much more natural sequence results if "Tony" is used, as the 
sequence (4a)-(4e) illustrates. 
(4) a. Terry really goofs sometimes. 
b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he was excited about trying out his new sailboat. 
c. He wanted Tony to join him on a sailing expedition. 
d. He called him at 6AM. 
e. Tony was sick and furious at being woken up so early. 
f. He told Terry to get lost and hung up. 
g. Of course, he hadn't intended to upset Tony. 
In Discourse (4)' utterances (f)  and (g) exhibit the same kind of misdirection as do utterances 
(3d) and (3e) in Discourse (3). The focus has shifted from Terry to Tony in the short 
subsegment of utterances (e)-(f) so that use of "he" in (g) is confusing. This confusion is 
avoided in the sequence of Discourse (5). 
(5) a. Terry really goofs sometimes. 
b. Yesterday was a beautiful day and he was excited about trying out his new sailboat. 
c. He wanted Tony to join him on a sailing expedition. 
d. He called him at 6AM. 
e. Tony was sick and furious at being woken up so early. 
f. He told Terry to get lost and hung up. 
g. Of course, Terry hadn't intended to upset Tony. 
We conjecture that the form of expression in a discourse substantially affects the resource de- 
mands made upon a hearer in discourse processing and through this influences the perceived 
coherence of the discourse. It is well known from the study of complexity theory that the 
manner in which a class of problems is represented can significantly affect the time or space 
resources required by any procedure which solves the problem. Here too we conjecture that 
the manner, i.e. linguistic form, in which a discourse represents a particular propositional 
content can affect the resources required by any procedure that processes that discourse. 
We use the phrase inference load placed upon the  hearer to refer to the resources required 
to extract information from a discourse because of particular choices of linguistic expression 
used in the discourse. We conjecture that one psychological reflex of this inference load is 
a difference in perceived coherence among discourses that express the same propositional 
content using different linguistic forms. 
One of the tasks a hearer must perform in processing a discourse is to identify the referents of 
noun phrases in the discourse. It is commonly accepted, and is a hypothesis under which our 
work on centering proceeds, that a hearer's determination of noun phrase reference involves 
some process of inference. Hence a particular claim of centering theory is that the resource 
demands of this inference process are affected by the form of expression of the noun phrase. 
In Section 8, we discuss the effect on perceived coherence of the use of pronouns and definite 
descriptions by relating different choices to the inferences they require the hearer or reader 
to make. 
Basic Center Definitions 
We use the term centers of an utterance to refer to those entities that serve to  link that 
utterance to other utterances in the discourse segment which contains it. It is an utterance 
(i.e. the uttering of a sequence of words at a certain point in the discourse) and not a 
sentence in isolation that has centers. The same sentence uttered in different discourse 
situations may have different centers. Centers are thus discourse constructs. Furthermore, 
centers are semantic objects, not words, phrases, or syntactic forms. 
Each utterance U in a discourse segment (DS) is assigned a single backward-looking center, 
Cb(U, DS), and a set of forward-looking centers, Cf (U, DS). To simplify notation, when the 
relevant discourse segment is clear, we will drop the associated DS and use Cb(U) and Cf (U). 
The backward-looking center of utterance Un+l connects with one of the forward-looking 
centers of utterance U,. The forward-looking centers of U, depend only on the expressions 
that constitute that utterance; they are not constrained by features of any previous utterance 
in the segment. The elements of Cf(Un) are partially ordered to reflect relative prominence in 
U,. In Section 6, we discuss a number of factors that may affect the ordering on the elements 
of Cf. The more highly ranked an element of Cf(Un), the more likely it is to be Cb(Un+l). 
Because Cf(Un) is only partially ordered, some elements may, from Cf (U,) information alone, 
be equally likely to Cb(Un+l). In such cases, additional criteria are needed for deciding 
which single entity is the Cb (Un+1). Some recent psycholinguistic evidence suggests that the 
syntactic role in Un+l may determine this choice (Gordon, Grosz, and Gilliom, 1993). 
In the remainder of the paper we will use a notation such that the elements of Cf are ranked 
in the order they are l i ~ t e d . ~  In particular, for presentational purposes, we will use the 
following schematic to refer to the centers of utterances in a sequence: 
For U,: Cb(Un) = a,  Cf(Un) = (bl, b2, ... bp), a = bk, for some k. 
For Un+l: Cb(Un+l) R bm and, for all j, j < m, bj is not realized in Un+l; 
i.e. bm is realized in Un+l and no higher ranked bj is realized in Un+1. 
The connection, R, between the backward-looking center of utterance Un+1 and the forward- 
looking centers of utterance U, may be of several types. To describe these types, we need 
2To simplify the presentation in the remainder of this paper, we will assume in most of the discussion 
that there is a total order with strict ordering between any two elements; a t  those places where the partial 
ordering makes a significant difference we will discuss that. 
to introduce two new relations, realizes and directly realizes, that relate centers to linguistic 
expressions. 
We will say that 
U directly realizes c 
if U is an utterance of some phrase3 for which c is the semantic interpretation. Realizes is 
a generalization of directly realizes. This generalization is important for capturing certain 
regularities in the use of definite descriptions and pronouns. 
The precise definition of 
U realizes c 
depends on the semantic theory one adopk4  One feature that distinguishes centering from 
other treatments of related discourse phenomena is that the realization relation combines 
a variety of factors, including syntactic, semantic, discourse, and intentional ones. That 
is, the centers of an utterance in general, and the backward-looking center specifically, are 
determined on the basis of a combination of factors related to the utterance, the discourse 
segment in which it occurs, and various aspects of the cognitive state of the participants of 
that discourse. 
Thus, for a semantic theory to support centering, it must provide an adequate basis for com- 
puting the realization relation. For example, NP directly realizes c may hold in cases where 
NP is a definite description and c is its denotation, its value-free interpretation (discussed in 
Section 9), or an object related to it by "speaker's reference" (Kripke, 1977). More impor- 
tantly, when NP is a pronoun, the principles that determine the c's for which it is the case 
that NP directly realizes c do not derive exclusively from syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic 
factors. They are principles that must be elicited from the study of discourse itself. An 
initial formulation of some such principles is given in Section 9.5 
Finally, we also define three types of transition relations across pairs of utterances. 
1. CENTER CONTINUATION: Cb(Unt1)= Cb(Un) and this entity is the most highly ranked 
element of Cf(Untl). In this case, Cb(Untl) is the most likely candidate for Cb(Unt2); 
it continues to be Cb in Untl and continues to be likely to fill that role in Unt2. 
3U need not, and in general will not, be a full clause. We use U here to  stress again that it is the utterance, 
not the string of words. 
* ~ n  the original manuscript, we defined realize in terms of situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983) 
and said the relation held "if either c is an element of the situation described by the utterance U or c is 
directly realized by some subpart of U." We discuss this further in Section 9. 
51n the examples in this paper, we will be concerned with the realization relationship that holds between 
a center and a singular definite noun phrase; i.e. cases where an N P  directly realizes a center c. Several 
extensions to the theory presented here are needed to handle plural, quantified noun phrases and indefinites. 
It is also important to  note that not all noun phrases in an utterance contribute centers to  Cf(U) and not 
only noun phrases do so. More generally, events and other entities that are more often directly realized by 
verb phrases can also be centers whereas negated noun phrases typically do not contribute centers; the study 
of these issues is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
2. CENTER RETAINING: Cb(Untl) = Cb(Un) but this entity is not the most highly ranked 
element in Cf(Untl). In this case Cb(Untl) is not the most likely candidate for 
Cb(Unt2); although it is retained as Cb in Untl it is not likely to fill that role in 
in Un+2. 
3. CENTER SHIFTING: Cb(Untl) # Cb(Un). 
The coherence of a segment is affected by the kinds of centering transitions engendered by 
a speaker's choices of linguistic realizations in the utterances constituting the segment. Of 
particular concern are choices among (1) CONTINUATION of the center from one utterance 
not only to  the next, but also to subsequent utterances; (2) RETENTION of the center from 
one utterance to  the next; (3) SHIFTING the center, if it is neither retained nor continued. 
5 Claims of Centering Theory 
The centering framework described above provides the basis for stating a number of claims 
about the relationship between discourse coherence, inference load, and choice of referring 
expression. We briefly list several major claims in this section, and elaborate on the evidence 
or motivation for each in subsequent sections. 
A unique Cb: Each U, has exactly one backward-looking center. It might be thought 
that a more general definition would allow for multiple backward-looking centers as 
well as multiple forward-looking centers. However, this is not the case as we show in 
Section 6. 
a Ranking of Cf: The Cf elements are partially ordered according to a number of 
factors. Several of the factors posited to affect this ordering are discussed in Section 6. 
Ranking of elements in Cf(Un) guides determination of Cb(Untl); because Cf(Un) is 
only partially ordered, additional factors may constrain the ~ h o i c e . ~  
Centering constrains realization possibilities: Rule 1, discussed in Section 7, 
stipulates one constraint centering imposes on realization. We expect that other such 
constraints exist. 
Preferences among sequences of center transitions: Rule 2, discussed in Sec- 
tion 7, hypothesizes a preference among types of transitions. 
Primacy of partial information: The information needed to compute a complete 
unique interpretation for an utterance may not be available until subsequent utterances 
are produced. Thus, as discussed in Section 9, to support centering, a semantic theory 
must support the construction of partial interpretations, in particular for elements of 
Cf. 
'This point is connected with the discussion of partial ordering in Section 4. 
10 
Locality of Cb(U,): The choice of a backward-looking center for an utterance U, 
is from the set of forward-looking centers of the previous utterance U,-l. In this 
sense the Cb is strictly local. Cb(U,) cannot be from Cf(UnF2) or other prior sets of 
forward-looking  center^.^ 
Centering is controlled by a combination of discourse factors: Center deter- 
mination is not solely a syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic process. 
6 Factors Governing Centering 
Before we can examine the linguistic features that contribute to an entity's being the 
backward-looking center of an utterance, it is necessary to provide support for the claim 
that there is only a single backward-looking center. In the definitions in Section 4, there is a 
basic asymmetry between the Cf7 which is a set, and the Cb7 which is a singleton. Sequences 
like those in (6) seem to suggest that there might be multiple Cb7s, analogous to  the partially 
ordered set of Cf7s. A priori there is no reason to think that either Susan or Betsy alone is 
the Cb of utterance (6b). 
(6) a. Susan gave Betsy a pet hamster. 
b. She reminded her that such hamsters were quite shy. 
However, if we consider different subsequent utterances, it becomes clear that Susan and 
Betsy do not have an equivalent status in the second utterance. The ranking of the Cf7s 
matters. The variants (7) - (10) differ only in their choice of realization of Susan and Betsy, 
in particular in which is pronominalized and which is in subject position. 
(7) a. Susan gave Betsy a pet hamster. 
b. She reminded her that such hamsters were quite shy. 
c. She asked Betsy whether she liked the gift. 
(8) a. Susan gave Betsy a pet hamster. 
b. She reminded her that such hamsters were quite shy. 
c. Betsy told her that she really liked the gift. 
(9) a. Susan gave Betsy a pet hamster. 
b. She reminded her that such hamsters were quite shy. 
7 ~ t  may on occasion appear to  be from Cf(Un-2) or prior sets of forward-looking centers, but then it is 
only because it  is in Cf(Un-l) also. 
c. Susan asked her whether she liked the gift. 
(10) a. Susan gave Betsy a pet hamster. 
b. She reminded her that such hamsters were quite shy. 
c. She told Susan that she really liked the gift. 
If both Susan and Betsy were equally likely backward-looking centers in the second utterance 
of these sequences, then all of these variants would be equally good or, perhaps, there would 
be a preference for variants (7) and (9) which exhibit continuity of grammatical subject and 
object. However, this is not the case. There is a marked decrease in acceptability from 
version (7) to version (10) and for many people version (10) is completely unacceptable. 
The problem is not merely a change from a pronoun back to a proper name, as this happens 
to the same extent in all four variants. It also cannot be attributed solely to a change from 
grammatical subject to grammatical object position as variant (8) involves such a change 
and yet is better than variant (9) which does not. Rather, it must be the case that Susan is 
the Cb at  utterance (b) at each of the variants. Variants (9) and (10) can be shown to be 
worse than (7) and (8) because they violate the centering rules presented in the next section. 
This example suggests that pronominalization and subject position are possible linguistic 
mechanisms for establishing and continuing some entity as the Cb. If, as for Susan in the 
second utterance of these sequences, an entity is realized by a pronoun in subject position, 
then it is most likely to be the Cb. Utterance (7c) continues Susan as Cb whereas utter- 
ance (8c) merely retains her. Utterances like (8c) may be used to provide a basis for a 
shift in Cb.8 However, this leaves open questions of the independence of syntactic role and 
pronominalization, and the predominance of either, for controlling centering. 
The fact that being in subject position contributes in and of itself to the likelihood an entity 
will be the highest ranked Cf (i.e. likely to be the next Cb), can be seen by contrasting the 
following two sequences which differ only in their final utterances: 
(11) a. Susan is a fine friend. 
b. She gives people the most wonderful presents. 
c. She just gave Betsy a wonderful bottle of wine. 
d. She told her it was quite rare. (Susan told Betsy) 
e. She knows a lot about wine. (Susan knows ...) 
(12) a. Susan is a fine friend. 
'The effect of various linguistic constructions on center movement and the interactions of centering shifts 
with global discourse structure are active areas of research. Section 10 provides references to  such work. 
b. She gives people the most wonderful presents. 
c. She just gave Betsy a wonderful bottle of wine. 
d. She told her it was quite rare. (Susan told Betsy) 
e. Wine collecting gives her expertise that's fun to share. (Susan's expertise) 
In the (c) utterance of each sequence, Susan is the Cb. Either Susan or Betsy might be 
the referent of the subject pronoun in the fourth utterance; however, there appears to  be a 
strong preference for Susan (i.e. for the reading "Susan told Betsy").g Because this prefer- 
ence might be attributable to parallelism, the last utterance in (12) provides a crucial test. 
If the Cf ranking depended on pronominalization alone, the fourth utterance would allow 
either Susan or Betsy to be the highest ranked Cf. Parallelism would suggest different pref- 
erences for the Cb (12e) in the two sequences. However, the preferred reading of the pronoun 
(respectively, "she" and "her") in utterance (e) of both sequences is Susan who is realized 
in the subject position of the (d) utterances. This preference holds regardless of syntactic 
position in the (e) utterances. Thus, we can establish a preference for subject position. In 
other circumstances, however, as the examples below illustrate, the Cb may be realized in 
other grammatical roles. 
In the first clause of both utterances (13d) and (14d) the direct object is pronominalized; the 
pronoun "it" refers to the green plastic tugboat. In (13) taking the boat to  be the highest 
ranked Cf and hence the most likely referent for "the silly thing" in the second clause of 
utterance (d) yields a coherent and easily comprehensible discourse.1° In (14), however, 
pragmatic information leads to a preference for the bear, not the boat, to be the referent of 
"the silly thing" in the last utterance; this preference is in conflict with the boat's being the 
most likely Cb. That (13) is a more coherent discourse than (14) can be explained on the 
basis of this difference.'' 
(13) a. Have you seen the new toys the kids got this weekend? 
b. Stuffed animals must really be out of fashion. 
'Sequences in which a similar pronominalization pattern is used but in which the fourth utterance implies 
report of a dialogue (e.g. "She thanked her and told her she appreciated that the wine was quite rare.") may 
lead to  interpretations in which the subject pronoun is taken as referring to Betsy; accentuation of the subject 
may also be used to  achieve this result. The first of these suggests a strong interaction between dialogue verbs 
and centering which is also apparent in direct-speech dialogue examples. The relationship between this kind 
of lexical-semantic influence over centering and that of so-called 'empathy' verbs, e.g. (Kameyama, 1985; 
Walker, Iida, and Cote, 19941, remains to be determined. The second would appear to  provide additional 
evidence for subject preference in centering, based on results of Hirschberg and Ward (1991) showing that 
accenting served to flip preferences (in their study from either strict-to-sloppy or sloppy-to-strict readings 
for anaphors in the antecedent clause in VP-ellipsis constructions). 
''For the sake of this argument, assume that children like bigger things more than smaller things. If this 
is not the case, then the argument merely flips which variants are more acceptable. 
''The discrepancy is even greater if "it" is used in the last utterance clause. However, one might attribute 
this to repetition of the use of "it" and so we have avoided the repeated use of a pronoun. We also note 
that "the silly thing" conveys additional information - roughly, the speaker's attitude toward the bear or 
tugboat (cf. Section 8). 
c. Susie prefers the green plastic tugboat to the teddy bear. 
d. Tommy likes it better than the bear too, but only because the silly thing is bigger. 
(14) a. Have you seen the new toys the kids got this weekend? 
b. Stuffed animals must really be out of fashion. 
c. Susie prefers the green plastic tugboat to the teddy bear. 
d. Tommy likes it better than the bear too, although the silly thing is bigger. 
Thus, the discourses in (11) to (14) suggest that grammatical role is a major determinant of 
the ranking on the Cf, with SUBJECT > OBJECT(S) > OTHER. The effect of factors such as 
word order (especially fronting), cla,usal subordination, and lexical semantics as well as the 
interaction among these factors are areas of active investigation; Section 10 again provides 
references to such work. 
In summary, these examples provide support for the claim that there is only a single Cb, that 
grammatical role affects an entity's being more highly ranked in Cf, and that lower ranked 
elements of the Cf cannot be pronominalized unless higher ranked ones are. Psycholinguistic 
research since 1986 (Hudson-D'Zmura, 1988; Gordon, Grosz, and Gilliom, 1993) supports 
the claims that there is a single Cb and that grammatical role plays a determining role in 
identifying the Cb. It furthermore suggests that neither thematic role nor surface position 
are determinants of the Cb. In contrast, both grammatical role and surface position were 
shown to affect the Cf ordering. Although there are as yet no psycholinguistic results related 
to the role of pronominalization in determining Cb(Un-I), cross-linguistic work (Prince and 
Walker, 1993; Walker, Iida, and Cote, 1994) argues that it plays such a role. Section 10 lists 
several papers appearing after G J W ~ ~  that investigate factors that affect the Cf ordering. 
7 Constraints on Center Movement and Realization 
The basic constraint on center realization is given by RULE 1 which is stated in terms of the 
definitions and schematic in Section 4. 
RULE 1: If any element of Cf(Un) is realized by a pronoun in U,+l then the 
Cb(U,+l) must be realized by a pronoun also. 
In particular, this constraint stipulates that no element in an utterance can be realized as a 
pronoun unless the backward-looking center of the utterance is realized as a pronoun also.12 
Note that Rule 1 does not preclude using pronouns for other entities so long as the Cb is 
realized with a pronoun. (This is illustrated in examples 7 to 10 in Section 6.) Psychological 
''Rule 1 ignores certain complications that may arise if one of the forward-looking centers of U,+l is 
realized by a deictic pronoun. 
research (Gordon, Grosz, and Gilliom, 1993; Hudson-D'Zmura, 1988) and cross-linguistic 
research (Di Eugenio, 1990; Kameyama, 1985; Kameyama, 1986; Kameyama, 1988; Walker, 
Iida, and Cote, 1990; Walker, Iida, and Cote, 1994) subsequent to G J W ~ ~  have validated that 
the Cb is preferentially realized by a pronoun in English and by equivalent forms (i.e. zero 
pronouns) in other languages. 
The basic constraint on center movement is given by RULE 2. 
RULE 2: Sequences of continuation are preferred over sequences of retaining; and 
sequences of retaining are to  be preferred over sequences of shifting. 
In particular, a pair continuations across U, and across Un+1, represented as 
Cont (U,,Un+l) and Cont (Un+1 ,Un+2) respectively, is preferred over a pair of re- 
tentions, Ret(Un,Un+l) and Ret(Un+l,Un+z). The case is analogous for pair of 
retentions and a pair of shifts. 
Rule 2 reflects our intuition that continuation of the center and the use of retentions when 
possible to produce smooth transitions to a new center provides a basis for local coherence. 
In a locally coherent discourse segment, shifts are followed by a sequence of continuations 
characterizing another stretch of locally coherent discourse. Frequent shifting leads to  a lack 
of local coherence as was illustrated by the contrast between Discourse (1) and Discourse (2) 
in Section 3. 
Although several cross-linguistic studies have investigated Rule 2 (see Section lo) ,  there are 
as yet no psycholinguistic results empirically validating it. 
8 Applications of the Rules 
The two centering rules along with the partial ordering on the forward-looking centers de- 
scribed in Section 6 constitute the basic framework of center management. These rules can 
explain a range of variations in local coherence.13 
A violation of Rule 1 occurs if a pronoun is not used for the backward-looking center and 
some other entity is realized by a pronoun. Such a violation occurs in the following sequence 
presumed to be in a longer segment which is currently centered on John (cf. also examples (9) 
and (10) in Section 6): 
(15) a. He has been acting quite odd. [Cb = John = referent("he7')] 
b. He called up Mike yesterday. [Cb = John = referent ("he")] 
13~hese  rules and constraints have also been used by others as the basis for pronoun resolution algorithms 
based on centering. The earliest such attempt (Brennan, Friedman, and Pollard, 1987) used the uniqueness 
and locality of Cb constraints and ranked the Cf by grammatical role; it employed a variant of Rule 2 
in which the stated preferences on transitions were restricted to  transitions between individual pairs of 
utterances (rather than the longer sequences in the original formulation) and used to decide between possible 
interpretations of pronouns. Section 10 provides references to  other work on centering algorithms. 
c. John wanted to meet him urgently. [Cb = John; referent("himn) = Mike] 
The violation of Rule 1 leads to the incoherence of the sequence. The only possible inter- 
pretation is that tlie "John" referred to in (15c) is a second person named "John," not the 
one referred to in the preceding utterances in (15); however, even under this interpretation 
the sequence is very odd. The next example illustrates that this effect is independent of the 
grammatical position of the Cb and also demonstrates that Rule 1 operates independently 
of the type of centering transition. 
(16) a. John has been acting quite odd. 
b. He called up Mike yesterday. [Cb = John = referent ("he")] 
c. Mike was studying for his driver's test. [Cb = Mike = referent("hisn)] 
d. He was annoyed by John's call. 
Without utterance (16c), this sequence, like the sequence in (15), is unacceptable unless it 
is possible to consider the introduction of a second person named "John". The intervening 
utterance (c) here provide for a shift in center from John to Mike, making the full sequence 
coherent .I4 
It is important to notice that Rule 1 constrains the realization of the most highly ranked 
element of the Cf(Un) that is realized in Un+1 given that pronominalization is used. Obviously 
any entities realized in Un that are not realized in Un+l, including the Cb(Un) as well as the 
highest ranked element of Cf(Un), do not affect the applicability of Rule 1. Likewise, if 
no pronouns are used, then Rule 1 is not applicable. Two particular ways in which such 
situations may hold have been noticed in previous research. Each leads to a different type 
of inference load on the hearer both of which we believe relate to Rule 1; however, neither 
constitutes a violation of Rule 1. The resulting discourses are coherent, but the determination 
of local coherence (in the first case) or the detection of a global shift (in the second case) 
require additional inferences. 
The first case concerns realization of the Cb by a non-pronominal expression. Rule 1 does not 
preclude using a proper name or definite description for the Cb if there are no pronouns in an 
utterance. However, it appears that such uses are best when the full definite noun phrases 
that realize the centers do more than just refer. They convey some additional information, 
i.e. lead the hearer or reader to draw additional inferences. The hearer or reader not only 
infers that the Cb has not changed even though no pronoun has been used, but also recognizes 
that the description holds of the old Cb. Sequences (17) and (18) are typical cases.15 
(17) a. My dog is getting quite obstreperous. 
14Empirical investigations of these claims of G J W ~ ~  suggest they are too strong. In particular, the results 
of Gordon et al. (Gordon, Grosz, and Gilliom, 1993) suggest that (17d) without the intervening (c) utterance 
is not as bad as (16c). 
15Sequence (17) is an adaptation of one of Sidner's examples (Sidner, 1979). 
b. I took him to the vet the other day. 
c. The mangy old beast always hates these visits. 
(18) a. I'm reading 'The French Lieutenant's Woman'. 
b. The book, which is Fowles best, was a best seller last year. 
The second case concerns the use of a pronoun to realize an entity not in the Cf(U,); such 
uses are strongly constrained. The particular cases that have been identified involve instances 
where attention is shifted globally back to a previously centered entity (e.g. (Grosz, 1977; 
Reichman, 1985)). In such cases additional inferences are required to determine that the 
pronoun does not refer to a member of the current forward-looking centers and to identify the 
context back to which attention is shifting. Further investigation is required to determine the 
linguistic cues (e.g. intonation or cue phrases (Grosz and Hirschberg, 1992)) and intentional 
information that are required to enable such shifts while preserving coherence. 
A third complication arises in the application of Rule 1 in sequences in which the Cb of 
an utterance is realized but not directly realized in that utterance. This situation typically 
holds when an utterance directly realizes an entity implicitly focused by an element of the 
Cf of the previous utterance. For instance, it arises in utterances containing noun phrases 
that express functional relations (e.g. "the door," "the owner") whose arguments have been 
directly realized in previous utterances (e.g. a house) as occurs in the sequence, 
(19) a. The house appeared to have been burgled. 
b. The door was ajar. 
c. The furniture was in disarray. 
In this segment, the house referred to in (19a) is an element of the Cf(19a). This house is 
the Cb(19b); it is realized but not directly realized in (19b). Because the house is the Cb, 
the Cf (19b) includes it as well as the door that is directly realized in the utterance. The 
Cb(19c) is thus again house. We assume here that the door ranks above the house in Cf 
(19b). If (19b) is followed by a sentence with 'it' in the subject position, then 'it' is more 
likely to refer to the door.16 This is consistent with the ranking of the door ahead of the 
house in Cf (19b). However, continuity of the house as a potential Cb for ( 1 9 ~ )  is reflected in 
the discourse segment being interpreted to be "about" the house and (19c) being interpreted 
in the same way as (19b) with respect to the house. In G J W ~ ~  we did not explore this issue 
further; the general issue of the roles of functional dependence and implicit focus in centering 
remain open.17 
The use of different types of transitions following the rankings in Rule 2 are illustrated by 
the discourse below. 
16However, it can refer to  the house. For example if (b) were followed by "Otherwise from the outside it 
appeared quite normal. Inside was a different story." 
17See Section 10 for some recent references related to  this issue. 
(20) a. John has been having a lot of trouble arranging his vacation. 
b. He cannot find anyone to take over his responsibilities. (he = John) 
Cb = John; Cf = {John) 
c. He called up Mike yesterday to work out a plan. (he = John) 
Cb = John; Cf = {John, Mike} (CONTINUE) 
d. Mike has annoyed him a lot recently. 
Cb = John; Cf = {Mike, John} (RETAIN) 
e. He called John at 5 am on Friday last week. (he = Mike) 
Cb = Mike; Cf = {Mike, John) (SHIFT) 
Utterance (20b) establishes John both as the Cb and the most highly ranked Cf. In utterance 
(20c) John continues as the Cb, but in utterance (20d) he is only retained; Mike has become 
the most highly ranked element of the Cf. Finally, in utterance (20e) the backward-looking 
center shifts to being Mike. Rule 1 is satisfied throughout (20). Rule 1 depends only on the 
ordering of elements of Cf, and not on the notions of retaining and continuation. 
9 Requisite Properties of Underlying Semantic The- 
ory 
Different semantic theories make different commitments with respect to the completeness 
or definiteness required of an interpretation. Because the information needed to compute 
a unique interpretation for an utterance is not always available at the time the utterance 
occurs in the discourse, the ways in which a theory treats partial information affects its 
computational tractability as the basis for discourse interpretation. It is not merely that 
utterances themselves contain only partial information, but that it may only be subsecluent 
to an utterance that sufficient information is available for computing a unique interpretation. 
No matter how rich a model of context one has, it will not be possible to fully constrain 
the interpretation of an utterance when it occurs. This is especially true for definite noun 
phrase interpretation. For example, several interpretations are possible for the noun phrase, 
"the Vice-President of the United States," in the utterance 
(21) The Vice-President of the United States is also President of the Senate. 
One interpretation, namely the individual who is currently Vice-President, provides the 
appropriate basis for the interpretation of "he" in the subsequent utterance given in (22): 
(22) Right now, he is the President's key person in negotiations with Congress. 
However a different interpretation, one which retains some descriptive content, provides the 
appropriate basis for an interpretation of the pronoun "he" in the slightly different subsequent 
utterance 
(23) Historically, he is the President's key person in negotiations with Congress. 
A semantic theory that forces a unique interpretation of utterance (21) will require that a 
computational theory or system either manage several alternatives simultaneously or provide 
some mechanism for retracting one choice and trying another later. On the other hand, a 
theory that allows for a partially specified interpretation must provide for refining that 
interpretation on the basis of subsequent utterances. Additional utterances may provide 
further constraints on an interpretation, and sequences of utterances may not be coherent, 
if they do not allow for a consistent choice of interpretation. For example, the utterance in 
(24) is perfectly fine after (22), but yields an incoherent sequence after (23).ls 
(24) As Ambassador to China, he handled many tricky negotiations, so he does well in this 
job. 
To summarize, given that one purpose of discourse is to increase the information shared by 
speaker and hearer, it is not surprising that individual utterances convey only partial infor- 
mation. However, the lack of complete information at the time of processing an utterance 
means that a unique interpretation cannot be definitely determined. In constructing a com- 
putational model, we are then left with three choices: compute all possible interpretations 
and filter out possibilities as more information is received; choose (on some basis) a most 
likely interpretation and provide for "backtracking" and computing others later; compute 
a partial interpretation. We conjecture that this third choice is the appropriate one for 
noun-phrase interpretation. 
Centering theory and the centering framework rely on a certain picture of the ways in which 
utterances function to convey information about the world. One role of a semantic theory 
is to give substance to such a picture. At the time G J W ~ ~  was written, it struck us that 
situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983) provided a particularly convenient setting in 
which to frame our own theory of discourse phenomena, though our account relied only on 
general features of this approach and not on details of the theory as then articulated. The two 
most important features of situation semantics from the standpoint of the theory of discourse 
interpretation we wished to develop were (1) that it allows for the partial interpretation 
of utterances as they occur in discourse, and (2) that it provides a framework in which 
a rich theory of the dependence of interpretation on abstract features of context may be 
elaborated. There is now a large situation semantics literature that contains many extensions 
and refinements of the theory to which we refer the interested reader. The original book 
(Barwise and Perry, 1983) may be consulted for an account of the distinction between value- 
free and value-loaded interpretations used below. 
In the discussion and examples in previous sections, the Cb and the elements of Cf have all 
been the denotations of various noun phrases in an utterance. The actual situation is more 
complicated even if we ignore for the moment quantifiers and other syntactic complexities 
''These examples were first written in 1986 when George Bush was Vice-President. They remain useful 
for illustrating the original points if the time of original writing is taken into account. As we discuss later, 
taken as spoken now they illustrate new points. 
(cf. (Webber, 1978)) as well as cases in which the center is functionally dependent on, or 
otherwise implicitlyfocused by, an element of the Cf of the previous utterance (cf. Section 8). 
A singular definite noun phrase may contribute a number of different interpretations to  
Cf. In particular, not only the value-free interpretation, but also various loadings may be 
contributed. 
For example, in the utterance, "The Vice-President of the United States is also President 
of the Senate," the noun phrase "the Vice-President" contributes both a value-loaded and 
a value-free interpretation. The value-free interpretation is needed in the sequence (25a-c) 
whereas the value-loaded interpretation is needed in (26a-c). 
(25) a. The Vice-President of the United States is also President of the Senate. 
b. Historically, he is the President's key man in negotiations with Congress. 
c. He is required to be 35 years old. 
(26) a. The Vice-President of the United States is also President of the Senate. 
b. Right now, he's the president's key person in negotiations with Congress. 
c. As Ambassador to China, he handled many tricky negotiations, so he is well- 
prepared for this job. 
The Cb(25b) and the Cb(26b) are each directly realized by the anaphoric element "lie7'. 
But Cb(25b) is the value-free interpretation of the noun phrase, "the Vice-President" (as in, 
"The Vice-President of the United States is the President's key man in negotiations with 
Congress"), whereas Cb(26b) is the value-loaded interpretation (as in "the person who now is 
Vice-President of the United States"). That this is so is demonstrated by the fact that (25c) 
is true in 1994 whereas (26c) is not. Centering accommodates these differences by allowing 
the noun phrase "the Vice-President of the United States" potentially to contribute both its 
value-free interpretation and its value-loading at the world type to Cf(25a). Cb(25b) is then 
the value-free interpretation and Cb(26b) is the value-loaded one (at the time of the writing 
of G J W ~ ~ ,  George Bush, but now [I9941 Al Gore). In each sequence, the (a) utterance 
underdetermines what element to add to Cf. This underdetermination may continue in 
a subsequent utterance with the pronoun. For example, that would be the case if the 
introductory adverbials were left off the (b) utterances. 
We believe the correct approach to take in these cases is to add the value-free interpretation 
to Cf and then load it for the interpretation of subsequent utterances if this is necessary. 
These loading situations thus constitute a component of the centering constituent of the 
discourse situation. It remains an open question how long to retain these loading situations, 
although those corresponding to elements of Cf that are not carried forward (either as the 
Cb or as Cfs of the subsequent utterance) can, obviously, be dropped. 
It is possible for an utterance to prefer either a value-free (VF) or value-loaded (VL) in- 
terpretation but not force it. For example, the second utterance in the following sequence 
prefers a VF interpretation but allows for the VL interpretation that is needed in the third 
utterance. 
(27) a. A: The Vice-President of the US is also President of the Senate. 
b. B: I thought he played some important role in the House. 
c. A: He did, but that was before he was the Vice-President 
In a similar way the second utterance in the following sequencelg prefers the VL interpret a- 
tion, but allows for the VF. The third utterance requires the VF interpretation. 
(28) a. John thinks that the telephone is a nuisance. 
b. He curses it every day. 
c. He doesn't realize that it is an invention that changed the world. 
In these examples, both value-free and value-loaded interpretations are shown to  stem from 
the same full definite noun phrase. 
There appear to be strong constraints on the kinds of transitions that are allowed, however. 
In particular, if a given utterance forces either the VF or the VL interpretation, then only 
this interpretation is possible in the immediately subsequent utterance. However, if some 
utterance only prefers one interpretation (in a given context), but allows the other, then the 
subsequent utterance may pick up on either one. 
For example, the sequence, 
(29) a. The Vice-President of the United States is also President of the Senate. 
b. He's the President's key man in negotiations with Congress. 
in which "he" may be interpreted either VF, or VL, may be followed by either (30) or (31): 
(30) As Ambassador to China, he handled many tricky negotiations. (VL) 
(31) He is required to be at least 35 years old. (VF) 
However, if we change (29b) to force the value-loaded interpretation, as in (26), then only 
the value-loaded interpretation (30) is possible. Similarly, if (29b) is changed to force the 
value-free interpret ation, as in (25b), then only the value-free interpretation (31) is possible. 
Speaker intentions may also enter into the determination of which entities are in the Cf. 
The referential uses of descriptions, of which Donnellan (1966) gives examples, demonstrate 
cases in which the "referential intentions" of the speaker in his use of the description play a 
role in determining Cb(U). For example, consider the following sequence 
lgChristine Nakatani provided this example which is far more compelling than the one originally in G J W ~ ~ .  
(32) a. Her husband is kind to her. 
b. No, he isn't. The man you're referring to  isn't her husband. 
(33) a. Her husband is kind to her. 
b. He is kind to her but he isn't her husband. 
In these examples,20 the speaker uses a description to refer to something other than the 
semantic denotation of that description, i.e. the unique thing which satisfies the description 
(if there is one). There are several alternative explanations of such examples, involving 
various accounts of speaker's intentions, mutual belief, and the like. A complete discussion 
of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The importance of these cases resides in showing that Cf(U) may include more than one 
entity that is realized by a single NP in U. In this case, "her husband" contributes both 
the husband and the lover to Cf(32a) and Cf(33a). This can be seen by observing that 
both discourses seem equally appropriate and that the backward looking centers of (32b) 
and (33b) are respectively the husband and the lover, which are realized by their anaphoric 
elements. 
These examples introduce a number of research issues concerning the representation and 
management of the Cb and Cf discourse entities. The account given here depends on a 
semantic theory that permits minimal commitment in interpretations. The open question 
is which constraints on centers are introduced at  which points during processing. We must 
leave this as a topic for future work. 
10 Related Work 
This theory can be contrasted with two previous research efforts that spurred this work: 
Sidner's (1979) original work on immediate focusing and pronouns, and Joshi and Weinstein's 
(1981) subsequent work on centering and inferences. 
The centering theory discussed here is quite close to Sidner's original theory, both in at- 
tacking local discourse issues and in the general outline of approach. However, it differs in 
several details. In Sidner's theory, each utterance provides an immediate discourse focus, an 
actor focus, and a set of potential foci. The discourse and actor foci may coincide, but need 
not. Her potential foci are roughly analogous to our Cf. The Cb for an utterance sometimes 
coincides with her actor focus and sometimes with her discourse focus. She distinguishes 
these two to  handle various cases of multiple pronouns. However, as we have shown, utter- 
ances do not have multiple Cbs. Furthermore, utterances can have more than two pronouns, 
so merely adding a second kind of immediate focus is of limited use. The difference between 
these two theories can be seen from the following example: 
"These examples are from (Kripke, 1977), p. 21. 
(34) a. I haven't seen Jeff for several days. 
b. Carl thinks he's studying for his exams, 
c. but I think he went to  the cape with Linda. 
On Sidner's account, Carl is the actor focus after (34b) and Jeff is the discourse focus. 
Because the actor focus is preferred as the referent of pronominal expressions, Carl is the 
leading candidate for the entity referred to by he in (34c). It is difficult to rule this case out 
without invoking fairly special domain-specific rules. On our account, Jeff is the Cb at  (34b) 
and there is no problem. The type of example Sidner was concerned about would occur if 
utterance (34c) were replaced by "He thinks he studies too much". However, the centering 
rules would still hold in this case. They provide no constraints on additional pronouns so 
long as the highest ranked Cf is realized by a pronoun. However, the rules are incomplete; 
in particular, as given they do not specify which pronoun in a multipronoun utterance refers 
to the Cb. The center management rules are based solely on the Cb and the highest ranked 
member of the Cf. As a result, while there are cases of multiple pronouns for which the 
theory makes incomplete predictions, having both an actor and a discourse focus will not 
handle these cases in general. 
Joshi and Kuhn (1979) and Joshi and Weinstein (1981) presented a preliminary report on 
their research regarding the connection between the computational complexity of the in- 
ferences required to process a discourse and the coherence of that discourse as assessed by 
measures that invoke centering phenomena. However, their basic definitions conflate the 
centers of an utterance with the linguistic expressions that realize those centers. In some of 
their examples it is unclear whether the shift in center or the particular expression used to  
realize the center is responsible for differences in coherence and inference load. Our present 
work has clarified these differences while maintaining Joshi and Weinstein's basic focus on 
the interaction between inference load and center management. 
Since G J W ~ ~  was first circulated a number of researchers have tested and developed aspects 
of the theory presented here.21 This follow-on research can be roughly grouped in a few main 
areas: 
Cross-linguistic work on centering: (German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Korean, and 
Turkish): (Kameyama, 1985; Kameyama, 1986; Kameyama, 1988; Di Eugenio, 1990; 
Walker, Iida, and Cote, 1990; Yongkyoon, 1991; Walker, Iida, and Cote, 1994; Rambow, 
1993; Hoffman and Turan, 1993; Ziv and Grosz, 1994). 
Centering algorithms: (Brennan, Friedman, and Pollard, 1987; Walker, 1989; Walker, 
Iida, and Cote, 1994; Kehler, 1993; Baldwin, 1993) 
Empirical and psycholinguistic evaluation of centering predictions: (Hudson, Tanen- 
haus, and Dell, 1986; Hudson-D'Zmura, 1988; Walker, 1989; Brennan, 1993; Gordon, 
Grosz, and Gilliom, 1993; Gordon and Scearce, 1993; Gordon and Chan, 1993) 
210ur listing in this section is based on the best information available to  us. It is quite possible that we 
have missed some references. We will be grateful if readers could send us missing references. 
23 
Centering and linguistic realizations:(Passonneau, To appear; Cote, 1992; Cote, 1993; 
Hurewitz and Linson, 1993; Kameyama, 1993; Nakatani, 1993; Passonneau, 1991; 
Prince and Walker, 1993; Suri and McCoy, 1993; Walker, 1989) 
Centering, dialogue, and global discourse structure: (Walker and Whitt aker, 1990; 
Brennan, 1993; Hurewitz and Linson, 1993; Roberts, 1993; Sparck Jones, 1993; Walker, 
1993) 
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